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Thoughts About Giles and Forfeiture 
in Domestic Violence Cases* 
Myrna S. Raeder† 
INTRODUCTION 
In choosing a topic for this festschrift celebrating 
Professor Berger’s venerable career as an evidence professor 
and scholar, I decided that since there were likely to be many 
contributions in the field of scientific evidence, I would write 
instead about a recent Supreme Court pronouncement 
concerning the Confrontation Clause. Nearly twenty years ago, 
Professor Berger explicated a prosecutorial restraint model of 
Confrontation Clause analysis.1 She has also authored Supreme 
Court amici briefs in Idaho v. Wright2 and Lilly v. Virginia.3 
While I am sure she will not agree with all of my views about 
Giles v. California,4 I know that she will enjoy reading about 
the topic.  
Crawford v. Washington5 was a watershed case in 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, which rejected the 
reliability test articulated in Ohio v. Roberts6 in favor of a 
  
 * © 2010 Myrna S. Raeder. All rights reserved.  
 † 2008-2009 Justice Marshall F. McComb Professor of Law, Southwestern 
Law School. This essay is dedicated to Professor Margaret Berger, a mentor and friend, 
whose acuity of analysis permeates all of her writings. 
 1 Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation 
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992). 
 2 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support 
of Respondent, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-260), 1989 WL 1127312. 
Wright held statements of a young child who did not testify and which were admitted 
pursuant to a state residual exception that mirrored what is now Federal Rule of 
Evidence 807 violated the Confrontation Clause because they lacked particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 497 U.S. at 822-23.  
 3 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the ACLU of Virginia, in Support of Petitioner, Lilly v. Virginia, 
527 U.S. 116 (1997) (No. 98-5881), 1998 WL 901782. Lilly held the admission of a 
nontestifying accomplice’s confession as a declaration against the declarant’s penal 
interest violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 527 U.S. at 142. 
 4 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
 5 541 U.S. 56 (2004). 
 6 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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“testimonial” approach. Justice Scalia’s originalist reading of 
the Confrontation Clause now requires exclusion of testimonial 
hearsay if the declarant does not testify at trial, unless the 
prosecution can demonstrate the declarant is unavailable and 
there was a previous opportunity to cross-examine her.7 In the 
wake of Crawford’s reshaping of Confrontation Clause 
analysis,8 lower courts were left reading tea leaves to discern 
how to apply this new framework, particularly in domestic 
violence cases where the complainant typically refuses to 
testify, or has been permanently silenced by her abuser.  
The rub then, was to figure out what is testimonial and 
what is not in a domestic violence setting, a matter not 
inconsequential given that Crawford led to wholesale 
dismissals of domestic violence charges, and increased the 
number of trials of defendants who refused to plead guilty 
optimistically predicting that the absence of the complainant 
would result in their acquittal.9 The domestic violence advocacy 
community hoped the next major Confrontation Clause case, 
Davis v. Washington,10 would opt for a domestic violence 
exception to general Confrontation Clause analysis. Failing 
this, they urged a contextual view of domestic violence that 
recognized the patterned nature of such abuse, and, as 
Professor Tuerkheimer has suggested, its temporal aspects.11 
Davis consolidated two separate cases in which the 
complainants failed to testify at trial, one involving a 911 call 
introduced against Davis, and the other involving statements 
made to officers at the defendant Hammon’s home by his wife. 
While Davis was supposed to fill in the blanks, its 
bright-line test for determining if a statement is testimonial 
has been criticized as unworkable by Justice Thomas,12 and 
does not answer many of the hard questions posed when trying 
to define testimonial statements.13 Davis’ circuitous definition 
  
 7 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 8 Id. at 53-54. 
 9 See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 750, 820 (2005). 
 10 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 11 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 823 (2007); 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An 
Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 616 (2007); see also Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic Violence Context”, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711, 721-30 (2009). 
 12 Id. at 842 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 13 See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass 
Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759 (2007) [hereinafter Raeder, After Davis]. 
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of testimonial statements, essentially saying statements are 
testimonial, unless they are not, predictably led to even more 
confusion about applying the testimonial approach to dual 
purpose statements—statements in which the victim sought 
help from law enforcement, but which also arguably serve as 
after-the-fact descriptions of criminal behavior.  
Unhappy with the mixed result in Davis, which 
reversed Hammon’s conviction and affirmed the conviction of 
Davis,14 victims’ advocates pinned their hopes on forfeiture by 
wrongdoing as a way to ensure the admission at trial of 
testimonial statements made by absent domestic violence 
victims. In other words, if the defendant’s own conduct caused 
the absence of the declarant at trial, then the defendant had 
forfeited his right to object to the admission of her testimonial 
hearsay. Crawford’s oblique reference to forfeiture was 
reiterated in Davis,15 emboldening advocates to argue that 
forfeiture was required when the defendant killed a victim who 
had previously made statements to the police identifying him 
as her abuser. A number of courts readily agreed and did not 
require any demonstration that the defendant actually 
intended to cause the victim to be absent as a witness at trial 
to establish forfeiture.16 Instead, they only required a 
preliminary fact showing that the defendant murdered the 
victim thereby causing her unavailability.  
Giles v. California17 was typical of such cases. The 
defendant was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend, 
Brenda Avie. No one saw the incident, although the 
defendant’s niece heard the victim call “Granny” several 
times.18 Brenda’s wounds were consistent with her having been 
the victim, rather than the assailant, but the defendant 
claimed she was insanely jealous, had threatened him, and had 
previously pulled a knife on someone else.19 The defendant 
further claimed he got a gun in self-defense and shot her 
accidentally.20 To rebut this, the prosecution offered the victim’s 
statements to an officer describing a previous incident of 
  
 14 Davis, 547 U.S. 813. 
 15 Id. at 833.  
 16 See United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 
(Kan. 2004); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 17 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
 18 Id. at 2681. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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domestic violence, where she claimed the defendant was 
jealous and threatened to kill her if she cheated on him.21 The 
court admitted these statements pursuant to a hearsay 
exception that allowed admission of threats of bodily harm, and 
the prosecution argued that the defendant forfeited his right to 
confront the victim.22 
Giles provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity 
to define the boundaries of forfeiture. Instead, like Crawford 
and Davis, Giles left open more questions than it answered, 
further muddying the waters in domestic violence cases, and 
offering no guidance about interpreting forfeiture in child 
abuse litigation. Giles explicitly held that constitutional 
forfeiture required an intent to deter a witness from 
testifying,23 in essence viewing such forfeiture as a sanction for 
witness tampering, not simply an equitable remedy for 
preventing the victim from testifying. It reached this 
conclusion by delving into the historic record. Again, like 
Crawford and Davis, the majority decision was written by 
Justice Scalia. Again, he utilized an originalist approach, and 
again his reading of history was challenged by other Justices. 
While the holding appears to be a blow to prosecutors trying to 
admit statements of dead victims, dicta in three of the five 
opinions in Giles taken together implies that potentially all of 
the Justices are inclined to treat evidence of forfeiture flexibly 
in domestic violence murder cases. Moreover, the case offers a 
number of other hints about how individual judges think about 
the evolving testimonial framework. Giles also raises questions 
about the nature and function of originalism in constitutional 
analysis.  
I. ORIGINALISM 
Giles began with a reprise of Crawford’s admonition 
that the Confrontation Clause was “most naturally read as a 
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, 
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the 
founding.”24 I have previously argued that originalism is bound 
to silence voices that were not heard in 1791, when the Sixth 
Amendment was adopted. At that time, domestic violence was 
  
 21 Id. at 2681-82. 
 22 Id. at 2682. 
 23 Id. at 2692.  
 24 Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)). 
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neither understood, nor criminalized, and the power of 
chastisement was recognized by the rule of thumb.25 Moreover, 
surviving wives would have been disqualified as witnesses 
against their husbands under the spousal disqualification 
doctrine. As the Court in Trammel v. United States26 observed: 
This spousal disqualification sprang from two canons of medieval 
jurisprudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to 
testify in his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; 
second, the concept that husband and wife were one, and that since 
the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband 
was that one. From those two now long-abandoned doctrines, it 
followed that what was inadmissible from the lips of the defendant-
husband was also inadmissible from his wife.27 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the cases referred to in 
Giles’ historic analysis are murder cases. 
Generally, trials looked nothing like they do today: 
neither the defendant, nor the interested witnesses testified, 
there was virtually no hearsay, no police officers to investigate 
or testify, and the trials were typically very short.28 Thus, using 
a historic approach towards confrontation, which has been 
described as a trial right,29 is likely to produce incongruous 
results. While originalists commonly maintain that historic 
rights can be applied to unforeseen situations, it is somewhat 
different to untether the common law right of cross-
examination from its 1791 context and then apply it to a world 
that not only uses substantially different evidentiary rules and 
investigative practices, but also reflects totally different social 
and political judgments about domestic violence.  
Further, the focus on the historic record has not 
resulted in consensus about the common law jurisprudence. 
Not only have several justices argued with the majority’s views 
about the nature of the confrontation right in 1791,30 but 
academics and legal historians have also weighed in on 
  
 25 Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and Children Too: Crawford’s Impact 
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 311-14 (2005) 
[hereinafter Raeder, Remember the Ladies]; Raeder, After Davis, supra note 13, at 774-75. 
 26 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
 27 Id. at 44. 
 28 See Raeder, Remember the Ladies, supra note 25, at 312. 
 29 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006). 
 30 See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2700-05 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
joined by Stevens, & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); Davis, 547 U.S. at 835-40 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part in judgment, and dissenting in part); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 72-74 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).  
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opposite sides of the issue.31 Thomas Davies, a legal historian, 
has argued that hearsay exceptions other than dying 
declarations were invented only after the framing, and that the 
framers would likely have condemned the expansion of hearsay 
exceptions.32 Therefore, it is odd to posit a theory of forfeiture 
for hearsay that would not have been admitted. I have often 
wondered why this reality has not produced arguments that 
hearsay exceptions enacted legislatively after 1791 are per se 
testimonial, since they are creations of governmental action 
that admit uncross-examined statements, just like those 
created by law enforcement. Moreover, as Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg indicated in their concurrence in Giles, “today’s 
understanding of domestic abuse had no apparent significance 
at the time of the Framing, and there is no early example of the 
forfeiture rule operating in that circumstance.”33 Despite 
Justice Scalia’s originalist view that intention to cause the 
witness’ absence at trial is necessary to establish forfeiture, he 
is willing to accept evidence of forfeiture based on a concept of 
isolation in the domestic violence context that is decidedly 
unoriginalist.  
History also presents an alternative view of forfeiture 
requiring cross-examination. As I have discussed elsewhere, 
under a testimonial regime, Reynolds would have admitted the 
previous testimony of the defendant’s wife without any 
discussion of forfeiture, because it had been cross-examined.34 
Of course, as Justice Scalia recognized, if forfeiture could not 
occur without cross-examination, it would render the theory 
irrelevant in the modern testimonial context.35 But, rather than 
viewing this disconnect as questioning his historic analysis,36 
  
 31 Compare Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did 
They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
105, 156-62 (2005), with Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A 
Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493, 494 (2007). 
 32 Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban 
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the 
Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352 (2007).  
 33 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695. 
 34 Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness 
Exceptions After Crawford, CRIM. JUST. 24, 31 (Summer 2005). 
 35 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 (“it amounts to self-immolation”). 
 36 See Leading Cases, Sixth Amendment—Witness Confrontation—Forfeiture 
by Wrongdoing Doctrine, 122 HARV. L. REV. 336, 345 (2008) (arguing forfeiture applied 
to domestic violence is poor candidate for originalism). 
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Justice Scalia claims intentionality is a historic feature of 
forfeiture.37  
But the larger questions are why has originalism 
overtaken Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis at 
all, and does it have any significance for interpretation of other 
criminal procedural and trial rights? Arguably, if a strict 
originalist approach were applied to other constitutional 
guarantees it would likely strip away many of the rights 
criminal defendants now enjoy. For example, Washington v. 
Texas, which rejected the traditional witness disqualification 
rule under its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process, quoted a Supreme Court decision from 
1918 for the proposition that modern criminal procedure should 
not be governed by “the dead hand of the common-law rule of 
1789.”38 Would the present focus on originalism discount 
compulsory process or other rights bound up in the right to 
present a defense?39 Similarly, Professor Dripps has suggested 
that the right to counsel could be affected by originalist 
reinterpretation.40 The irony of originalism in the Confrontation 
Clause context is that the right sounds absolute and defense-
oriented, but the historic approach narrowly construes the 
content of the right, making it inapplicable to accusatory 
nontestimonial hearsay where the defendant would want to 
cross-examine the unavailable declarant. In essence, 
originalism gives with one hand and takes away with the other.  
This same type of push-pull is becoming more noticeable 
in Fourth Amendment analysis. Professor Davies has 
contended that under “law-and-order originalism, the 
expansive police powers endorsed in contemporary search and 
seizure rulings are foreign to the Framers’ understanding of 
criminal procedure.”41 In addition, in the Fourth Amendment 
  
 37 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 38 388 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918) (affirming elimination of 
disqualification for felony conviction and reversing conviction for refusal to permit 
accomplice testimony)). 
 39 See generally, e.g., Martin A. Hewitt, Note, A More Reliable Right to 
Present a Defense: The Compulsory Process Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 96 
GEO. L.J. 273 (2007) (arguing for a narrower, bright-line test for the right to 
compulsory process informed by Crawford). 
 40 See Donald A. Dripps, Sixth-Amendment Originalism’s Collision Course 
with the Right to Counsel: What’s Titanic, What’s Iceberg? 2, 4 (San Diego Legal Stud. 
Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 07-79, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=952508. 
 41 Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: 
A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in 
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arena, originalists appear to accept that rights such as “knock 
and notice” existed at the founding, but then find that this does 
not require suppression of any evidence obtained in violation of 
that right, since the exclusionary rule is viewed as not 
constitutionally required,42 and subject to review for 
reasonableness.43 Even if the historic approach provides 
inconclusive results, originalists tend to interpret 
reasonableness narrowly to reject an exclusionary remedy.44 
Thus, in the post-Crawford era, Justice Scalia has written two 
majority opinions concerning the Fourth Amendment using the 
historic approach that denied the application of the 
exclusionary rule.45 Ironically, the reasonableness review 
depends on the same type of judicial balancing that Justice 
Scalia denigrated when rejecting the Ohio v. Roberts46 
reliability test in Crawford.47 Certainly, in the Fourth 
Amendment context the resort to reasonableness has resulted 
in shrinking protection for violations, as most recently 
demonstrated in Herring v. United States,48 where the Court 
asserted that it had “repeatedly rejected the argument that 
exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment 
violation.”49 A cynic might wonder if the resort to 
reasonableness as an end-run around the exclusionary rule 
evolved from the failure of Justices Scalia and Thomas to 
garner any support to jettison Miranda50 in the Fifth 
Amendment context in Dickerson v. United States.51  
  
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 240 (2002) (“[N]ineteenth and 
twentieth centur[y] American courts abandoned the Framers’ commitment to 
rigorously accusatorial criminal procedure as they drastically expanded police power.”). 
 42 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he rule is a 
judicially created [rule] designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect.”). 
 43 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan 547 U.S. 586, 595-96 (2006) (Scalia, J., majority 
opinion); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (Thomas, J., majority opinion). 
 44 See Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008) (no exclusion where 
arrest was based on a misdemeanor driving offense that should not have resulted in 
arrest under state law). 
 45 See id. at 1608; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 600. 
 46 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  
 47 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68 (2004).  
 48 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (exclusionary rule did not apply to police 
recordkeeping error). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 51 530 U.S. 428, 464-65 (2000) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
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Similarly, although Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
ostensibly favored the defense in Arizona v. Gant,52 which held 
the search of a defendant’s car was unreasonable after he was 
handcuffed, arrested, and secured in a patrol car, Justice 
Scalia’s view of reasonableness based on historical practices 
would actually allow searches not previously permitted. In 
other words, he would also consider it reasonable to search a 
vehicle not only when the object of the search is evidence of the 
crime for which the arrest was made, but also “of another crime 
that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.”53  
II. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF “TESTIMONIALISM” 
Giles provides glimpses into some of the Justices’ views 
about the boundaries of what I call “testimonialism.” The 
majority decision mentions that statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy would probably never be testimonial,54 repeating a 
similar pronouncement made in Crawford.55 Professor Berger 
would not necessarily agree, since she suggested pre-Crawford 
that statements to undercover informants should be governed 
by her prosecutorial restraint model of confrontation to make 
the government’s role in shaping evidence transparent to 
jurors.56 Given the Court’s current view of confrontation as 
restraining potential prosecutorial abuses, it is surprising that 
this issue has been summarily dismissed, albeit by dicta, in 
both Crawford and Giles, although this posture is consistent 
with a view of testimonialism that applies the confrontation 
right absolutely, but only to a very narrow range of statements.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion did suggest that domestic 
violence cases were not hampered by a non-intent-based 
forfeiture rule because “[s]tatements to friends and neighbors 
about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in 
the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, 
only by hearsay rules, which are free to adopt the dissent’s 
version of forfeiture by wrongdoing.”57 This reiterates 
Crawford’s suggestion that the Confrontation Clause does not 
apply outside of the law enforcement or governmental sphere, 
  
 52 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 53 Id. at 1725. 
 54 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008). 
 55 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). 
 56 See Berger, supra note 1, at 597-600. 
 57 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692-93. 
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ignoring the realistic possibility that statements will be made 
to private individuals as conduits for the express purpose of 
repeating them to the authorities. Similarly, the reference to 
physicians ignores any recognition that some doctors may be 
mandated to report domestic abuse, or that they may in some 
cases act as agents of the police, or in the case of forensic 
nurses, have roles that are decidedly dual in nature. Yet, since 
all of these references are dicta, written in general terms 
without concrete examples, courts will likely continue to divide 
on how broadly or narrowly they should interpret testimonial 
statements.  
While Justice Alito voted with the majority in Davis, he 
joined Justice Thomas in Giles, questioning whether the 
victim’s statement was testimonial because of its lack of 
formality.58 This appears to retreat from his vote to reverse 
Hammon’s conviction, since lack of formality would result in 
virtually no statements made in field investigations or 911 
calls being constitutionally protected because they were not 
considered the “equivalent of statements made at trial by 
‘witnesses.’”59 At a minimum, under this rationale, the 
statements to the police in Hammon would be nontestimonial 
even if the victim’s affidavit was not, suggesting its admission 
would have rendered the error harmless. To date, this is still a 
decidedly minority view, though Justice Scalia’s cryptic 
reference that “we accept without deciding” that the 
statements were testimonial60 leaves room to speculate whether 
anyone else will jump ship. Ironically, the most likely 
candidate would be Justice Scalia based on his pre-Crawford 
view in White.61 However, given that he authored Davis, such a 
result appears improbable.  
Yet, there may be another way of arguing these 
statements are not testimonial. Davis explained that when the 
Court stated in Crawford “‘interrogations by law enforcement 
officers fall squarely within [the] class’ of testimonial hearsay, 
we had immediately in mind (for that was the case before us) 
interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past 
crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the 
  
 58 Id. at 2694. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 2682. 
 61 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
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perpetrator.”62 Thus, Davis redefined testimonial statements in 
the 911 or field investigation context, typical in domestic 
violence prosecutions:  
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.63 
However, this definition arose in a context where the 
statements were being used in the prosecution of the crimes 
arising out of the incident in question. That is not how the 
evidence is used when domestic violence results in murder. In 
other words, the previous statements are not being used to 
convict the defendant of the earlier assault, but rather as 
circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to a later crime 
that was not committed at the time of the earlier statement. 
While such statements are accusatory, and the defendant 
would undoubtedly want to cross-examine the declarant about 
them, this is not the approach to testimonialism adopted by the 
Supreme Court.64 Indeed, considering such statements to be 
testimonial in the murder case smacks of a science fiction 
approach to crime, suggested by Minority Report, a film in 
which individuals were apprehended for offenses before they 
committed them.65 Assuming a free will approach to criminal 
responsibility, accusing someone of a past crime arguably does 
not qualify as testimonial when used as evidence of a future 
crime that has not yet occurred.  
This view is consistent with the Court’s explanation 
that the right to confrontation only arises at trial: “[t]he 
Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, 
because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, 
ex parte testimonial statements which offends that provision.”66 
The mere fact that statements arose out of a police 
investigation should not per se label them as testimonial when 
  
 62 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2003)). 
 63 Id. at 822. 
 64 See generally, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic 
Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Summer 2005). 
 65 MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century-Fox File Corp. et al. 2002). 
 66 Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6 (emphasis omitted). 
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introduced at a trial for some other separate crime as a piece of 
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate motive or identity 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) 404(b), or as 
evidence of the decedent’s state of mind, which is relevant as in 
Giles where the defendant claims the death was accidental or 
that he acted in self-defense.67  
This reasoning is analogous to that in Dowling v. United 
States, which held that neither double jeopardy nor due process 
were violated by the introduction of evidence relating to a 
crime for which the defendant had previously been acquitted.68 
Dowling was charged with a bank robbery in which the 
perpetrator wore a ski mask and carried a small gun.69 At his 
third trial for the robbery, a woman testified that Dowling 
entered her home along with another individual, and he wore a 
ski mask and carried a small gun.70 She was able to identify 
Dowling because she unmasked him during a struggle.71 The 
prosecution introduced this testimony on the theory that the 
mode of dress in both incidents occurring two weeks apart was 
similar, and the second man identified by the female witness 
was also involved in the robbery, thereby linking Dowling to 
him.72 However, Dowling had previously been acquitted of 
charges relating to the witness’ testimony. The Court reasoned 
that although the acquittal established that there was a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the masked man who 
entered the witness’ home two weeks after the bank robbery 
took place, that fact “did not determine an ultimate issue in the 
present case.”73 The decision recognized that the “jury’s verdict 
in his second trial did not entail any judgment with respect to 
the offenses charged in his first.”74 Moreover, under F.R.E. 
404(b), similar act evidence is relevant if the jury can 
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the 
defendant was the actor, a standard satisfied by F.R.E. 104(b).75 
In other words, it does not have to meet the preponderance 
  
 67 See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: 
Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1506-17 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder, 
Simpson and Beyond]; see also, e.g., State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 105 (Minn. 2005). 
 68 493 U.S. 342, 343-44 (1990).  
 69 Id. at 344. 
 70 Id. at 344-45. 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at 345. 
 73 Id. at 347-48. 
 74 Id. at 353. 
 75 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). 
2010] FORFEITURE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 1341 
 
standard that typically governs the admissibility of evidence, 
let alone satisfy proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Similarly, in a domestic violence murder trial the 
victim’s previous statement to the police is not being used to 
prove the offense that it describes, but simply constitutes evidence 
that is inferentially used to support a finding of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt for a different crime, committed at a later time. 
Therefore, the statement should not be considered testimonial for 
that purpose. In a related vein, Crawford v. Commonwealth 
recently held that statements in an affidavit supporting a request 
for a civil protective order were not testimonial when the 
defendant is later charged with the declarant’s murder, since her 
statements were not made for the primary purpose of reporting a 
past event for possible criminal prosecution.76 
Because Giles did not specifically address whether 
forfeiture applied to testimony initially obtained in one 
proceeding, but subsequently introduced at a second proceeding 
involving the same defendant charged with a different offense, 
courts are now being asked that question. For example, United 
States v. Vallee77 interpreted Giles’ “invitation . . . to the state 
court to explore defendant’s intent on remand” as extending 
forfeiture to murder trials, “provided . . . that the defendant 
intended to prevent the witness from testifying at an earlier 
proceeding.”78 Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court 
interpreted forfeiture to apply to both the ongoing proceeding 
as well as the murder.79 This interpretation would be 
unnecessary if a reevaluation of such statements deemed them 
to be nontestimonial. 
III. OPENING THE DOOR TO STATE OF MIND TESTIMONIAL 
STATEMENTS 
Several of the statements in Giles and other domestic 
violence femicides are relevant to the decedent’s state of mind, 
which would be admissible under F.R.E. 803(3) when the 
defendant claims that the killing was in self-defense or the 
death was an accident or suicide.80 In such instances, the 
  
 76 686 S.E.2d 557, 568-69 (Va. Ct. App. 2009). 
 77 304 F. App’x 916 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 78 Id. at 920-21 & n.3. 
 79 See State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 271-73 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). 
 80 See, e.g., People v. Abordo Espinosa, No. A102886, 2005 WL 941454, at *5 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr 25, 2005) (“[E]vidence of domestic violence . . . was relevant to 
rebut the defense’s theory that the shooting occurred in heat of passion in response to 
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decedent’s state of mind, typically fear of the defendant, is a 
window to her likely conduct in regard to the defendant. For 
example, the majority in Giles detailed the statements made to 
the police in the previous incident by Brenda Avie, the 
decedent and Giles’ ex-girlfriend, that Giles had accused her of 
having an affair, grabbed her, lifted her off the floor, choked 
her, punched her in the face, opened a folding knife, and 
“threatened to kill her if he found her cheating on him.”81 
Brenda’s wounds, which were described as consistent with 
defensive motions,82 would more likely be viewed as defensive if 
there was evidence that she feared the defendant. Similarly, 
the dissent characterized the defendant’s description of the 
victim as “jealous, vindictive, aggressive, and violent.”83 
Evidence of her fear would cast doubt on the defendant’s claim 
that she was jealous and threatened him.  
In this capacity, such statements should not be barred 
as testimonial, even if they were made to a police officer. First, 
the victim's statements are not being used to prove the crime 
that the police were then investigating, so, as previously 
mentioned, the decedent did not expect the statements to be 
used in relation to the murder. Second, fear is not used to prove 
an element of the current crime, but only to explain the 
decedent’s behavior, in evaluating the defendant’s version of 
the facts. Third, as I have argued elsewhere, by raising a 
defense that makes the decedent’s state of mind relevant to the 
case, the defendant’s trial strategy should be viewed as waiving 
any confrontation challenge concerning otherwise admissible 
evidence that rebuts the defendant’s testimony about the 
decedent’s state of mind.84 On occasion, such state of mind may 
be nonhearsay, which clearly escapes Crawford’s mandate. 
However, even if admitted via a hearsay exception, the 
statements would not typically be expected by the declarant to 
be used at a trial involving a different incident. Of course, 
F.R.E. 803(3) cannot be used to prove the underlying conduct 
producing the declarant’s state of mind,85 so such statements 
are viewed as prejudicial even if instructions are given as to 
  
[victim’s] nagging, instead of as the culmination of a pattern of abuse.”); see also 
Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 67, at 1506-17. 
 81 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681-82 (2008). 
 82 Id. at 2681. 
 83 Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). 
 84 See Raeder, Remember the Ladies, supra note 25, at 358-60. 
 85 See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
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their limited use. However, if the defendant offers to stipulate 
to the decedent’s state of mind, this factor can be analyzed by 
the judge in determining if admission is unduly prejudicial 
under the F.R.E. 403 balancing test. 
Moreover, it is arguable that defenses based on 
accident, suicide, and self-defense should make otherwise 
admissible evidence of the defendant’s state of mind admissible 
as well. For example Giles claimed Brenda was jealous, and 
described her alleged threats and jealous statements. In 
contrast, she described his threats and jealousy. In this 
context, not only should his claim of accident and self-defense 
open him to admission of her statements even if testimonial, 
but it should also open him to the statements she made 
concerning his state of mind, again assuming a basis for 
admission other than F.R.E. 803(3). No reliance needs to be 
given to forfeiture hearsay exceptions to cover her statement to 
the police officer, since most of them would be excited 
utterances or fit ad hoc trustworthiness exceptions. Thus, the 
testimonial ban is the only barrier to their admission. If the 
defendant opens the door with such a defense posture, I view it 
no differently than any other hard strategy decision that opens 
the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence. For example, 
Michigan v. Lucas held that excluding evidence of defendant’s 
past sexual conduct with the victim for failure to comply with a 
rape shield’s notice provision is not a per se violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.86 If trial strategy could result in the loss of a 
constitutional right pre-Crawford, there is no reason to require 
a different result post-Crawford.87 
IV. INFERRED INTENT 
The justices disagreed about the role of intent in the 
forfeiture analysis as well as how to evaluate intent in the 
domestic violence setting. Obviously, the majority opinion will 
be much cited in future domestic violence forfeiture cases to 
evaluate the type of evidence justifying forfeiture: 
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim 
from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to 
prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal 
  
 86 500 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1991). 
 87 United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 733 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding 
waiver and citing other post-Crawford cases finding no Confrontation Clause violation 
when defendant opens the door to inadmissible hearsay). 
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prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in 
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed 
the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse 
to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—
rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture 
doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the 
victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this 
inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which 
the victim would have been expected to testify.88 
The majority separates its reference to the defendant’s 
dissuading the victim to obtain help from its mention of the 
existence of ongoing criminal proceedings. This disjunction 
appears to eliminate any requirement for an ongoing 
prosecution, generally implying that there need not be a 
current case pending to find forfeiture. However, the dicta is 
directed to abuse that culminates in murder, leaving open 
whether the majority would infer intent in other types of 
prosecutions, or whether felonies would be treated differently 
than misdemeanors.  
The concurrence of Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
includes the following view of domestic violence evidence of 
forfeiture: 
[T]he element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent 
inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive 
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, 
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the 
evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this 
sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing 
defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the 
instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of anger.89 
This language does not limit inferred intent to murder cases, 
and the rationale provided describing the dynamics of domestic 
violence extends to all manner of domestic violence 
prosecutions. The broad language suggests that proof of the 
abusive relationship is all that is needed for transferred intent. 
Indeed, the dissent interprets Justice Souter’s concurrence as 
meaning “that a showing of domestic abuse is sufficient to call 
into play the protection of the forfeiture rule in a trial for 
murder of the domestic abuse victim.”90 In contrast, the 
majority indicates such evidence “may” support a finding, 
inferring that some specific acts or statements of the defendant 
  
 88 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693. 
 89 Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg J., concurring). 
 90 Id. at 2708 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). 
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are required to indicate an intent to isolate or dissuade the 
victim from obtaining help.91 
The dissent of Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Kennedy 
would not require any witness-tampering intent at all for 
forfeiture.92 Thus, it is clear that they will interpret this 
requirement flexibly. They specifically note:  
[e]ven the majority appears to recognize the problem with its 
“purpose” requirement, for it ends its opinion by creating a kind of 
presumption that will transform purpose into knowledge-based 
intent—at least where domestic violence is at issue; and that is the 
area where the problem is most likely to arise.93 
Justice Scalia rejects the dissent’s characterization that this is 
“nothing more than ‘knowledge-based intent,’”94 but his 
disclaimer appears to be one of degree, rather than kind. Thus, 
all of the justices would accept a flexible view of inferred intent 
in domestic violence cases, but the nuances of how to establish 
such intent, and how broadly to apply it is open to disagreement. 
Professor Lininger has recently proposed presumptive bright-
line rules to govern claims of domestic violence forfeiture and 
provide some consistency in application.95 
I have always been of the view that murder is different 
in the domestic violence context because the victim’s death is 
often accomplished in ways that are aimed at frustrating 
prosecution. Previous violence and threats instill fear in the 
victims who downplay their risk of continuing danger, and 
their murders are often accomplished at home without 
witnesses. Thus, prior to Giles, I argued that previous 
statements of the victim should be viewed akin to dying 
declarations of individuals who are not isolated,96 relying on 
Mattox v. United States.97 Mattox recognized that rules of law, 
“however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the 
accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public 
policy and the necessities of the case.”98 Ironically, while Justice 
  
 91 Id. at 2693 (majority opinion).  
 92 Id. at 2707-08 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens. & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). 
 93 Id. at 2708 (emphasis omitted). 
 94 Id. at 2693 (majority opinion). 
 95 See Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for 
Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 892-93 (2009); see also Myrna S. Raeder, 
Being Heard After Giles: Comments on The Sound of Silence, 87 TEX. L. REV. 105, 105 
(2009) [hereinafter Raeder, After Giles]. 
 96 See, e.g., Raeder, After Davis, supra note 13, at 778-79. 
 97 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
 98 Id. at 243. 
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Scalia’s opinion adopts the rationale that abusive relationships 
may support inferred intent, the two concurrers and three 
dissenters appear to form a different majority who adopt this 
rationale as proof of inferred intent without more. Thus, I 
expect the only forfeiture problem in murder cases will be when 
no classically abusive relationship can be established.  
In contrast, I have been more hesitant to substitute 
evidence of an abusive relationship as evidence of forfeiture 
without more when the complainant is alive but refuses to 
testify, since so many complexities about the relationship 
confound an automatic finding that the defendant is the cause 
of her unavailability. In other words, that approach ignores 
reasons as to her unavailability that cannot be attributed to 
acts of the defendant.99 Pre-Giles, I assumed specific evidence 
would be required, though “patterns of abuse and any 
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms [w]ould be factored 
into the analysis.”100 Yet, in future cases, the dissenters and 
concurrers could form a majority that would neither confine 
forfeiture to murder cases, nor require any evidence other than 
that of an abusive relationship. Paradoxically, grafting the 
modern view of the dynamics of domestic violence onto an 
originalist framework may eliminate not only the traditional 
requirement of any intent to witness tamper, but also the 
requirement of any specific showing of inferred intent beyond 
evidence of the abusive relationship in all cases, not just murder. 
In addition, Justice Breyer’s suggestion that states may 
accept broader forfeiture views in a nontestimonial context101 
has already borne fruit in Indiana, where Roberts v. State102 
held that a defendant forfeited any objection under the rules of 
evidence. Obviously, evidence of the abusive relationship is 
much less costly for the prosecution to obtain than specific 
evidence of witness tampering, unless the victim is 
uncooperative from the outset. Even without cooperation, 
previous complaints by the victim to the police can be 
evaluated by the court, since forfeiture would be decided under 
  
 99 Raeder, Remember the Ladies, supra note 25, at 363-64. 
 100 Myrna S. Raeder, Confrontation Clause Analysis After Davis, 22 CRIM. 
JUST. 10, 19 (Spring 2007) [hereinafter Raeder, Confrontation Clause]. 
 101 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681-82 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 102 894 N.E.2d 1018, 1024-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] party who has 
rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including 
homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness . . . 
under the Indiana Rules of Evidence.”). 
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F.R.E. 104(a), which permits consideration of hearsay.103 As I 
have argued elsewhere, the F.R.E. 104(a) standard permits the 
judge to consider character evidence including prior acts and 
expert testimony concerning the defendant’s abusive 
personality in determining the existence of forfeiture.104 
As I have also previously argued elsewhere, to the 
extent that an abusive relationship cannot be shown, in 
misdemeanors cases where the defendant is already on 
probation, parole, or supervised release, the better course may 
be simply to argue for the most severe penalty at revocation, 
since the Confrontation Clause is not implicated at such 
hearings, and the standard of proof is typically by a 
preponderance.105 Moreover, the absence of cross-examination 
satisfies due process when a sufficient explanation exists.106 The 
victim’s failure to cooperate or incompetency should supply 
good cause, and the statements would usually be found reliable 
because most of them would be admitted as excited utterances 
or through ad hoc exceptions that require trustworthiness. 
Ironically, while Hammon’s conviction was voided on 
Confrontation Clause grounds, he was also found guilty of a 
probation violation, and given his relatively short criminal 
sentence, the same penalty might have been reached via the 
revocation alone. The major difficulty with this approach is 
that it downplays the significance of the current crime, unless 
the defendant has previously committed a felony, which still 
offers the possibility of a substantial penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
Where has my foray into testimonialism and forfeiture 
taken me? Some may be surprised by my willingness to 
interpret testimonialism narrowly, since it results in a 
diminishment of cross-examination, something I have railed 
against for many years. However, I have always favored a 
balancing approach. And as this essay demonstrates, I have 
never been a fan of testimonialism because it disregards the 
core value of confrontation in relation to large quantities of 
  
 103 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 104 Raeder, After Giles, supra note 95, at 113. 
 105 Raeder, Confrontation Clause, supra note 100, at 19. 
 106 See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985) (“[P]robationer is entitled 
[under due process] to cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing body 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.”). 
1348 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
 
nontestimonial hearsay offered against the defendant, while at 
the same time dramatically impacting the prosecution for 
events outside the government’s control, even when the 
hearsay is reliable and critical to conviction.  
Not surprisingly, courts have attempted to evade the 
testimonial ban by finding the admission of testimonial 
evidence to be harmless error. This has been particularly 
evident in cases where the claim of forfeiture is rejected.107 The 
Supreme Court recently noted, “[w]here a decision has ‘been 
questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions and 
[has] defied consistent application by the lower courts,’ these 
factors weigh in favor of reconsideration.”108 One wonders 
whether the Court will one day reject Crawford and its progeny 
like it previously rejected Ohio v. Roberts,109 to return to a more 
balanced Confrontation Clause approach as suggested by 
Mattox v. United States.110 
  
 107 See, e.g., People v. Byron, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 386, 400 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009); People v. Moran, No. BA204002, 2009 WL 162293, at *7-10 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
Jan. 26, 2009); People v. Luster, No. B194825, 2008 WL 4571937, at *8 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. Oct. 15, 2008); People v. Tovar, No. G040052, 2008 WL 3524614, at *5 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2008); People v. Baker, No. 278951, 2008 WL 4762776, at *2 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2008); Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 706-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); 
see also In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 616-17 (Ill. 2008) (similar result in a child 
abuse case).  
 108 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (alterations in original). 
 109 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 110 156 U.S. 237 (1895); see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
